Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.

Focusing mainly on respect for autonomy, particularly autonomous choices and actions in bioethical decisions, I examine several complexities of enacting this respect through the case of a fourteen-year-old boy who died after being allowed to refuse a necessary blood transfusion on religious grounds. I argue that thicker concepts of autonomy, closely connected with relational autonomy, direct our attention to aspects of respect for autonomy that are often neglected or underappreciated in much bioethical theory and practice. In particular, they illuminate the (...) interpretive complexity of respecting autonomous choices by focusing attention on the relational context of individuals’ decisions, on respect for individuals’ social-cultural beliefs and values, and on the temporality of selves, as expressed in their past consent or future consent as well as in—and sometimes in contradiction to—their present consent or dissent. However, it is important not to convert the illuminating and valuable insights from theories of relational autonomy into necessary conditions of autonomous choices and actions and hence of respect for autonomy. (shrink)

"A very good book indeed: there is scarcely an issue anyone has thought to raise about the topic which Childress fails to treat with sensitivity and good judgement....Future discussions of paternalism in health care will have to come to terms with the contentions of this book, which must be reckoned the best existing treatment of its subject."--Ethics. "A clear, scholarly and balanced analysis....This is a book I can recommend to physicians, ethicists, students of both fields, and to those most affected--the (...) patients themselves."--Edmund D. Pellegrino, John Carroll Professor of Medicine and Medical Humanities, Georgetown University Medical Center. (shrink)

Knowledge through what others tell us not only forms a large part of the body of our knowledge but also originates the patterns of appraisal according to which we add beliefs to our present store of knowledge.1 I do not mean merely that what we add is often accepted from persons who have already contributed to our knowledge; beyond that, we have acquired habits of thought, tendencies to suspect and tendencies to approve both other-person-reports and purported perceptions, from our testimonial (...) relationships with others. For instance, who would not hesitate to say he saw a particular acquaintance (John Doe) at a visual distance of half a block, after he had just been told by someone he trusted and someone who ought to have known (e.g., John Doe’s wife) that John Doe had just telephoned from a store two hours travel time away? Yet apart from that report, one might have considered it evident that John Doe was half a block away, just because (ceteris paribus) it looked enough like John Doe; the evidence of our senses can be defeated by the authority we accord to the evidence of testimony. (shrink)

This is the first book to explore the relationship between Martin Heidegger's work and modern anthropology. Heidegger attracts much scholarly interest among social scientists, but few have explored his ideas in relation to current anthropological debates. The discipline's modernist foundations, the nature of cultural constructionism and of art ñ even what an anthropology of art must include ñ are all informed and illuminated by Heidegger's work. The author argues that many contemporary anthropologists, in their concern to return subjectivity and 'voice' (...) to their interlocutors, neglect to recognize that language and other representational practices conceal the world and human subjectivity as much as reveal it. The author also suggests that Heidegger's critique of western technology provides the basis for a return to anthropology's sociological foundations. Emerging from over ten years of original research, and drawing on a rich knowledge of Australian and Melanesian ethnography, this book reassesses the underlying framework of modern and, particularly, visual anthropology. Innovative and provocative, it will be of interest to all anthropologists, philosophers and students of art and culture. (shrink)

This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.

Public health ethics, like the field of public health it addresses, traditionally has focused more on practice and particular cases than on theory, with the result that some concepts, methods, and boundaries remain largely undefined. This paper attempts to provide a rough conceptual map of the terrain of public health ethics. We begin by briefly defining public health and identifying general features of the field that are particularly relevant for a discussion of public health ethics.Public health is primarily concerned with (...) the health of the entire population, rather than the health of individuals. Its features include an emphasis on the promotion of health and the prevention of disease and disability; the collection and use of epidemiological data, population surveillance, and other forms of empirical quantitative assessment; a recognition of the multidimensional nature of the determinants of health; and a focus on the complex interactions of many factors—biological, behavioral, social, and environmental—in developing effective interventions. (shrink)

Philosophers are uniquely qualified to negotiate a balance between the reflective potential of globalization and the great routine powers of nations, states, tribes, and families. Here's how we can do it: we can teach the difference between playing a game and choosing a game. From time immemorial people of all tribes and cultures have marked a sharp distinction between those individuals deemed qualified by age, expertise, or status to choose or write the rules, and those other, lesser individuals who are (...) obliged merely to obey those rules. This is the traditional difference between a person, on the one hand, and a utensil, on the other: persona est sui iuris; servus non est persona ("A person chooses its own laws; a slave is not a person"). Persons, but not utensils such as shoes, have, and deserve, good will. To a person, a culture is a means of creating a sustainable humane environment. To a culture, a person is a means for the culture to replicate itself. Placing culture first is a tradition we can no longer afford to maintain, because it makes enduring peace impossible. The purposes utensils can be made to serve have become too terrible (and, with the advent of global communication, too obvious) for the human race to endure, and the capacity of the voiceless to express themselves violently is increasing without limit. Hence we must create new traditions in which we teach all our children reflective thought, with which rules are pragmatically justified rather than unquestionable. To that end I propose to distinguish random, routine, and reflective thought and action. Each of these three levels of thought and action has its costs and its benefits; together they contain the entire range of human possibility. Three familiar philosophical concepts support my claim that reflective thought and action can and must be taught to and learned by all. (shrink)

In answering his primary question, What is existence?, Dom Mark draws an equation between "assertibility," "existence," "being," and "reality": "...this assertibility is precisely what we mean by existence or being or reality". And "assertibility," I take it, implies and is really identified with intelligibility; for all being is "assertible" just because and in so far as it is intelligible. So far, so good. The real difficulty is in Dom Mark's identification of "existence" and "being": "The existence of X, Y, and (...) Z simply is X, Y, and Z, but looked at as wholly dependent". And again: "...existence or being refers to every knowable object under that aspect which each has, of complete dependence on a source from which they are derived" p. 22). It is quite clear that in this doctrine existence is not the act of a dependent being, whereby that being is; "existence" is that very being considered as dependent. Dom Mark has firmly grasped and well explained the character of the created existent, as such, but at the same time he has identified the created existent with created existence--the creature, as such, with the creature's act of existence. (shrink)

This paper explores some issues concerning the nature and structure of causal explanation in psychiatry and psychology from the point of view of the “interventionist” theory defended in my book, Making Things Happen. Among the issues is explored is the extent to which candidate causal explanations involving “upper level” or relatively coarse-grained or macroscopic variables such as mental/psychological states (e.g. highly self critical beliefs or low self esteem) or environmental factors (e.g. parental abuse) compete with explanations that instead appeal to (...) underlying, “lower level” or more fine gained neural, genetic, or biochemical mechanisms. (shrink)

Philosophy studies the relation between random, routine, and reflective thought and action. It is in essence the reflective study of routine. No one can survive a random world, but a routine world will generate the same randomness it is intended to avoid owing to the inevitable errors associated with routines. The prime function of reflective inquiry is to identify and explain the logical foundation of these errors. While governments depend on strict routine to prevent anarchy, it is only with the (...) maintenance and adaptive revision of those routines that they are able to serve that purpose. Thus philosophy is essential even to preserve routine, aside from facilitating the building of better routines. To advance global understanding philosophers need to use informal means to communicate to all people everywhere the distinction between randomness and routine, and the transcending of routine by reflective study. I add a concluding note of advocacy for UNESCO’s Strategy on Philosophy. (shrink)

In Wisdom and Initiation in Gabon, Bonaventure Mvé Ondo argues that Fang tales, myths, and legends are components of the foundation of a worldview that sustains and protects a unique, historical Fang identity. The lessons transmitted from generation to generation by these marvelous stories are, Mvé Ondo argues, central to living lives that reflect and perpetuate the eternal truths of the Fang experience.

The topics covered in this volume, originally published in 1973, include the need for a more adequate concept or definition of education, the issue of whether indoctrination is compatible with education, particularly with moral education, and the processes of judging the merits of different approaches to aesthetic education. Two contributors present complementary analyses of the relations between freedom as a characteristic of institutions and the process of learning to be a free man. There is discussion of the neglected subject of (...) rights and duties in education, with special emphasis on the question of a universal right to education. The volume concludes with papers on the relevance of philosophy to the practical judgments of educators and to education as a field of study. (shrink)

This study examines some of the moral and theological convictions that created tensions for early Christians who affirmed that the government's sword is ordained by God for a fallen world but also that Christians should not exercise it at least in warfare. Three important moral pressures toward Christian participation in war were the recognition of prevention or removal of harm as a requirement of neighbor-love, the related sense of responsibility, fault, and guilt for omissions, and the generalization test proposed by (...) Celsus, who asked Christians to consider what would happen if everyone did what they were doing, i.e., refrained from military service. Along with many other factors, these ideas contributed to the legitimation of Christian participation in war. But this legitimation itself created additional tensions, particularly because of the requirements to "turn the other cheek," to "go the second mile," etc. In order to lessen these tensions, the Church and its theologians developed several interrelated distinctions that could reduce the scope or strength of the radical demands: higher/lower; for oneself/ for others; inner/outer; and private/public. (shrink)

Argues that Wittgenstein's early ethical notion of agreement with the world pivoted to become his later therapeutic notion of agreement with living forms, which satisfies the conditions necessary for a full therapeutic philosophy.

Most foundational texts on theological ethics address the person or the society; the point of departure determines, inevitably, fairly different trajectories. By starting with the experience of grief, this book posits the human as ineluctably social: grief is an epiphany that reveals how the human is inseparable from the collective. Indeed, grief inevitably summons us to grieve socially. Nothing discloses the human more rawly than grief that "it is not good for the human to be alone." Keenan then develops an (...) ethics of vulnerability, following Judith Butler, understanding it not primarily as a compromised state of being but rather as that which establishes the human as capacious for recognizing and responding to others. Mutual recognition, a theme that can be found from Georg Hegel and Sigmund Freud to Axel Honneth, Nancy Frasier and Jessica Benjamin, emerges as the first moral act of the vulnerable human. In light of vulnerability and recognition, Keenan shows how we can now understand conscience as guiding the activity of one who has first vulnerably recognized others. The second half of the book works out a Christian ethics of vulnerability, starting with discipleship, then grace and sin, then the virtues, and finally the communion of saints, the works of mercy, and the beatitudes. (shrink)

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 50, Issue 1, Page 7-19, March 2022.

I, for one, am grateful to Peter Ubel, Karen Scherr, and Angela Fagerlin (2017) for their important and illuminating reflections on medical decision making, particularly in the context of preferenc...

Do pacifists and proponents of justified violence share a starting point? Whether or not just war theory contains an embedded presumption against violence is an important and disputed question. Substantively it is important not only because it has implications for the possibility of dialogue among Christians of different persuasions but also because the belief that the tradition advances no moral reservations about the use of force may have the effect of lowering the moral barriers against the resort to war. Conceptually (...) it is important because it reflects a fundamental methodological disagreement concerning the meaning and resolution of conflicts among moral duties. (shrink)

The Ascent of Man develops a comprehensive theory of human nature. James F. Harris sees human nature as an emergent property that supervenes a cluster of properties. Despite significant overlap between individuals that have human nature and those that are biologically human, the concept of human nature developed in this book is different. Whether biologically human or not, an individual may be said to possess human nature. This theory of human nature is called the"cluster theory." Harris takes as his (...) point of departurePlato's comment that in learning what a thing is we should look to the ways in which it acts upon or is acted upon by other things. He commits to a methodological naturalism and draws upon current views from the social and biological sciences. The cluster theory he develops represents one of the very few completely novel theories of human nature developed in the post-Darwin era. It will prove most useful in dealing with philosophical questions involving such contemporary issues as cloning, cybernetics, and the possibility of extraterrestrial life. The fundamental conceptual issue is how plastic and elastic is the nature of human nature. Just how different might we imagine human beings to be and still be human in the sense that they still possess whatever it is that accounts for a unique nature? The theory of human nature developed in this book is a descriptive, dynamic, bottom-up, non-essentialist, naturalist theory. Harris is well versed in classical philosophy and contemporary behavioral science. He writes in a graceful, open-ended way that both educates and illuminates renewed interest in what it means to be human. (shrink)

This unique collection of readings provides a resource of primary source material, affording a survey of the history and systems of psychology from pre-Socratic thought to the present. Selected for accessibility, the 24 selections are organized to offer a representation of the historical sweep of psychological interpretations. After presenting approaches to the scholarly study of psychology's history, through an excerpt from Thomas Kuhn, the readings introduce the major themes of psychological inquiry in chronological fashion. The selections include the works of: (...) Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Wundt, Franz Brentano, William James, John Dewey, Sigmund Freud, Ivan Pavlov, John Broadus Watson, B.F. Skinner, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Carl Rogers. Features: Introductory essays for each group of readings provide important historical, social, and cultural background and context. Sample questions encourage critical reflection on the issues raised by the authors. Compatibility with most textbooks in the history and systems of psychology. (shrink)